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Competitive Bidding of Municipal Contracts in
Pennsylvania and the Litigation it Generates: Who
is the Lowest Responsible Bidder?
John K Gisleson*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Pennsylvania First Class Township Code ("the Code")1 es-
tablishes a procedural framework for competitive bidding of public
contracts that is intended to ensure that municipal contracts for
goods and services exceeding $10,000 in value are awarded only to
"the lowest responsible bidder."
2
Bidding requirements "are for the purpose of inviting compe-
tition, to guard against favoritism, improvidence, extrava-
gance, fraud and corruption in the awarding of municipal con-
tracts, and to secure the best work or supplies at the lowest
price practicable, and are enacted for the benefit of property
holders and taxpayers, and not for the benefit or enrichment
of bidders, and should be so construed and administered as to
accomplish such purpose fairly and reasonably with sole ref-
erence to the public interest."
Although the procedure for bidding contracts is clear, there has
been significant litigation challenging contract awards based on
the process used to award contracts and the basis for selecting the
lowest responsible bidder. "When competitive bidding is used and
the procedures followed emasculate the benefits of such bidding,
judicial intervention is proper."
* Mr. Gisleson is a trial lawyer in the Pittsburgh office of Schnader Harrison Segal &
Lewis LLP (www.schnader.com). Representing plaintiffs and defendants in various indus-
tries, his practice focuses on litigation of business disputes, including contract, fraud, and
fiduciary duty claims. This article arises from his experience litigating challenges to the
award of municipal contracts.
1. See generally First Class Township Code, 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 55101 et seq. (2002).
2. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 56802 (2002).
3. Yohe v. Lower Burrell Township, 208 A.2d 847, 850 (Pa. 1965) (quoting 10
MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, §28.19 at 266-67 (3d ed. 1981)); Price v. Philadel-
phia Parking Auth., 221 A.2d 138, 146 (Pa. 1966).
4. Ezy Parks v. Larson, 454 A.2d 928, 932 (Pa. 1982) (citing American Totalisator, Inc.
v. Seligman, 489 Pa. 568, 576, 414 A.2d 1037, 1041 (1980)).
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This article addresses the competitive bidding requirements ap-
plicable to first class townships' under the Code, identifies various
issues that arise in the context of evaluating bids, and discusses
challenging a contract award in an injunctive proceeding.
II. COMPETITIVE BIDDING REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE FIRST
CLASS TOWNSHIP CODE
"Townships may make contracts for lawful purposes and for the
purpose of carrying into execution the provisions of this act and
the laws of the Commonwealth."6 Whether bidding requirements
apply to particular contracts, and what those requirements are,
will vary depending on the dollar value of the contract.
A. When Competitive Bidding Requirements Apply
When a contract is less than four thousand dollars ($4,000) in
value, the township is not required to competitively bid the con-
tract in any way.'
When the contract exceeds four thousand dollars ($4,000) but is
less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), modified competitive
bidding requirements apply.8 Rather than pursue public bidding
for the contract, the township shall request "[w]ritten or tele-
phonic price quotations from at least three qualified and responsi-
ble contractors."9 If price quotations cannot be obtained from at
least that many such bidders, the township shall keep on file a
"memorandum showing that fewer than the three qualified con-
tractors exist in the market area within which it is practicable to
obtain quotations." ° The township must maintain a written re-
5. Section 55201 of Title 53 of Purdon's provides:
Townships of the first class shall be those having a population of at least three hun-
dred inhabitants to the square mile, which have heretofore fully organized and
elected their officers and are now functioning as townships of the first class in the
manner provided in this act. All townships, not townships of the first class, shall be
townships of the second class.
53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 55201 (2002). The website
http://www.dgs.state.pa.us/PAManual/Section6/sec6.htm identifies whether a particular
municipality is a first-class township. For purposes of this article, the terms "municipality"
and "township" are used interchangeably.
6. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 56801 (2002).
7. § 56802(a) (2002). The threshold for competitive bidding had been seven hundred
and fifty dollars ($750), which presumably was raised to reduce the administrative burden
on township officials from complying with competitive bidding requirements.
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cord of the quotations identifying "at least the date of the quota-
tion, the name of the contractor and the contractor's representa-
tive, the construction, reconstruction, repair, maintenance, or
work that was the subject of the quotation and the price."1 The
township must maintain those records for three years.2
With certain exceptions, 3 the full panoply of competitive bidding
requirements (discussed infra, section C) applies when contracts
exceed $10,000 in value. 4 In determining whether a contract
value exceeds $10,000 and therefore triggers the competitive bid-
ding requirements, the measure is the total payment necessary "to
obtain the services or property, or both."5 Thus, for a multi-year
contract, the contract amount is that which is paid over the course
of the contract and not the amount paid in a particular year (such
as the first year of the contract). In addition, a township may not
break a contract into parts with each part falling under the
$10,000 threshold in order to circumvent the bidding process. 6 It
in fact is "unlawful" to "evad[e] advertising requirements by mak-
ing a series of purchases or contracts each for less than the adver-
tising requirement price, or by making several simultaneous pur-
chases or contracts, each below said price, when in either case,
the transactions involved should have been made as one transac-
tion for one price." 7 Any township commissioner who evades the
advertising requirements may be civilly and criminally liable."5
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 56802(d) (2002). In addition, competitive bidding require-
ments will not apply if purely private money funds the contract even though a public entity
acts as a financing conduit. Williams v. Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh, 479 A.2d 452,
456 (1984).
14. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 56802(a) (2002).
15. Id.
16. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 56803(a) (2002).
17. Id.
18. Section 56803(a) and (b) of Title 53 of Purdon's provides:
Any commissioners who so vote in violation of this provision, and who know that the
transaction upon which they so vote is or ought to be a part of a larger transaction,
and that it is being divided in order to evade the requirements as to advertising for
bids, shall be jointly and severally subject to surcharge for ten per centum of the full
amount of the contract or purchase. Any commissioner who votes to unlawfully evade
the provisions of [§ 56802] and who knows that the transaction upon which he so
votes is or ought to be a part of a larger transaction and that it is being divided in or-
der to evade the requirements as to advertising for bids commits a misdemeanor of
the third degree for each contract entered into as a direct result of that vote. This
penalty shall be in addition to any surcharge which may be assessed pursuant to sub-
section (a).
53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 56803(a), (b) (2002). Section 56803(a) also provides that if a commis-
sioner votes in favor of splitting a contract in violation of that section, "but the purchase or
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Moreover, the bidding requirement for contracts exceeding
$10,000 applies even if the residents of the township--each of
whom individually would pay far less than $10,000-directly pay
the contractor, such as occurs in some townships for refuse collec-
tion. "The need for bidding requirements is just as compelling ...
where the [contractor] is compensated directly by the recipients of
his service as it is when the recipients pay for service through the
conduit of the municipal treasury."9 The reason is that taxpayers
ultimately pay the contract costs in either scenario. "A municipal-
ity cannot have unbridled discretion to enter into a contract and
then transfer the burden to pay to the citizens, without the citi-
zens having the opportunity to question the propriety of such con-
tract."" Those creating a contract [the Board of Township Super-
visors] must be responsible to others for their conduct, if only to
insure honesty in fact.
Although competitive bidding is clearly the preferred course of
letting contracts, the Code exempts six categories of contracts
from competitive bidding even though the value of the contracts
may exceed $10,000.21 Those categories are: (1) "maintenance, re-
pairs or replacements for water, electric, light, or other public
works of the township," but only so long as "they do not constitutenew additions, extensions or enlargements of existing facilities
and equipment;" (2) "improvements, repairs and maintenance of
any kind made or provided by any township through its own em-
ployees, [p]rovided, however, [t]hat all materials" used for those
activities shall "be subject to" bidding requirements if their cost is
in excess of four thousand dollars; (3) contracts or purchases
"where particular types, models, or pieces of new equipment, arti-
cles, apparatus, appliances, vehicles or parts thereof are desired
by the commissioners which are patented and manufactured
products;" (4) contracts or purchases "for used equipment, articles,
apparatus, appliances, vehicles or parts thereof being purchased
from a public utility;" (5) policies of insurance and surety company
bonds; and (6) contracts "involving personal or professional ser-
,,21vices.
contract on which he so voted was not approved by the board of commissioners," then the
commissioner will not be personally liable.
19. Yohe v. Lower Burrell Township, 208 A.2d 847, 850 (Pa. 1965).
20. Gleim v. Bear, 616 A.2d 1064, 1067 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992).
21. See 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 56802(d) (2002).
22. See 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 56802(d) (2002). See, e.g., The Lieberman Organiz. v. City
of Philadelphia, 595 A.2d 638, 641 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990) ("in order to qualify for a profes-
516 Vol. 41
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Finally, even if a township is not required to implement com-
petitive bidding under the Code for a contract exempted under §
56802(d), the township nonetheless must comply with bidding re-
quirements if it chooses to competitively bid a contract.23  In
American Totalisator Company, Inc. v. Seligman,4 for example,
the Commonwealth announced in its bid specifications that it
would award a contract for the supply of equipment and technol-
ogy for the Commonwealth lottery to the lowest responsible bidder
and proceeded to establish procedures for competitive bidding.
The municipality, however, failed to abide by the terms of its own
proposal in awarding the contract and permitted the successful
bidder to clarify its bid after the bids were opened.25 After being
challenged by an unsuccessful bidder, the municipality argued
that it was exempt from competitive bidding requirements be-
cause the contract was for professional services. 26 The Supreme
Court rejected the argument: "When competitive bidding is used
and the procedures followed emasculate the benefits of such bid-
ding, we believe judicial intervention is proper."
27
B. Requirements Applicable To Contracts Exceeding $10,000
Section 56802 of the Code establishes procedures a township
must follow to ensure that a contract "shall not be made except
with and from the lowest responsible bidder."2  The mandatory
nature of those procedures is evident from the fact that "[a]ny con-
tract made in violation of the provisions [in Section 56802] shall
be void."2 '9 A township needs to closely follow the procedures es-
tablished by the Code, while parties challenging a contract award
should scrutinize whether the township in fact complied with
those procedures.
First, the township must develop a notice to advertise the con-
tract to be awarded. The notice must provide the "full plans and
sional services exemption to competitive bidding, an individual need not possess state certi-
fication licensure or have a baccalaureate degree.") (holding that homeless services contract
was exempt under Philadelphia's Home Rule Charter).
23. American Totalisator Company, Inc. v. Seligman, 414 A.2d 1037, 1040 (Pa. 1980);
Stapleton v. Berks County, 593 A.2d 1323, 1330 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
24. 414 A.2d 1037 (Pa. 1980).
25. American Totalisator, 414 A.2d at 1041.
26. Id. Cf. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 56802(d)(5) (2002) (exempting contracts "involving
personal or professional services" from competitive bidding requirements).
27. American Totalisator Company, Inc., 414 A.2d at 1041.
28. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 56802(a) (2002).
29. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 56802(b)(3) (2002).
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specifications" of the project or provide a place where such plans
and specifications can be viewed and copied. ° The notice must
also set forth "the time and place of a public meeting" of the town-
ship commissioners or a committee thereof.3 At that meeting, the
"bids shall be publicly opened and read."2
Second, the township secretary must publish the notice. Publi-
cation must occur both by placing notice in an appropriate local
newspaper and by posting the notice "in a conspicuous place
within the township."3 The township must publish the first ad-
vertisement "not more than forty-five days and the second adver-
tisement not less than ten days prior to the date fixed for the
opening of bids."34
Third, "[a]ll plans and specifications shall be on file at least ten
days in advance of opening bids."35
Fourth, the board of commissioners may, if it chooses to do so,
have the bids opened and reviewed but then have the information
forwarded to them "for subsequent award at a public meeting."36
Such a procedure allows the committee to evaluate the responsi-
bility of the bidders and to tabulate bids to determine who is the
lowest bidder. The commissioners may wish to have the township
manager and/or other supervisors most directly affected by the
contract on the committee to evaluate a contractor's responsibility
to perform the contract. To the extent that the committee makes
recommendations concerning the responsibility of particular bid-
ders to the commissioners, it is advisable that the committee have
a clearly documented basis for the recommendation that is worthy
of reliance by the commissioners (i.e., knowledge of specific facts,
as opposed to hearsay, that is supported by first-hand observation
or by investigation of committee members). Even though a com-
mittee is used to review the bids, the township still must notify
30. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 56802(a), (b)(1) (2002).
31. Id.
32. Id. If said meeting "is an open meeting of the township commissioners, the contract
may be awarded." Id.
33. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. §56802(a) (2002). Notice must be placed:
in one newspaper of general circulation, published or circulating in the county in
which the township is situated, at least two times at intervals of not less than three
days where daily newspapers of general circulation are employed for such publica-
tion, or in case weekly newspapers are employed then the notice shall be published




36. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 56802(b)(2) (2002).
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bidders "and other interested parties, upon request, of the date,
time and location of the opening of bids [so that they] may be pre-
sent when the bids are opened."37
Fifth, unless a shorter time is prescribed by the township
commissioners, the successful bidder "shall be required," within
twenty days after the contract is awarded, "to furnish bond with
suitable reasonable requirements guaranteeing the performance
of the contract, with sufficient surety, in an amount as determined
by the township commissioners which shall be not less than ten
per centum nor more than one hundred per centum of the amount
of the liability under the contract."" The contract award "shall be
void" if the successful bidder fails to provide the appropriate bond
to the township."
Finally, all contracts or purchases "shall be in writing."'
III. "LOWEST RESPONSIBLE BIDDER"
Like many state statutes,41 as well as the City of Pittsburgh
Code of Ordinances, 42 the Code imposes a mandatory, unqualified
duty on a township to award the contract only to the lowest re-
sponsible bidder.43 "In every instance in which any contract for
any public work, construction, materials, supplies, or other mat-
ters or things for any township shall be awarded upon competitive
bids, it shall be the duty of the authorities authorizing the same to
award said contract to the lowest responsible bidder."' "The Legis-
lature repeatedly directs, as our cases hold, that all levels of gov-
37. Id.
38. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 56802(c) (2002).
39. Id.
40. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 56802(a) (2002).
41. See, e.g., The Separations Act, 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1003, and the Public Auditorium
Authorities Law, 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 23851(a).
42. Code of Ordinances of City of Pittsburgh, §161; City of Pittsburgh Home Rule Char-
ter, § 511.
43. Although statutorily required to award a contract to the lowest responsible bidder,
an invitation to bid on a contract is not an offer that can be accepted by such a bidder. See,
e.g., National Constr. Servs., Inc. v. Philadelphia Regional Port Auth., 789 A.2d 306, 309
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001) (quoting CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §2.3 (rev. ed. 1993)).
In Pennsylvania, as in most states, the 'best bidder' has no right to have the contract
awarded to it because the 'lowest responsible bidder' provisions are not there to give
the bidder any rights but to protect taxpayers as evidenced by the settled law that
only taxpayers have a right to seek an action to enjoin the contract.
National Constr. Servs., 789 A.2d at 309.
44. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 56802(b) (2002).
519
Duquesne Law Review
ernment-state, county, and municipal-award contracts only to
the 'lowest responsible bidder." 5
If a township fails to comply with this legislative mandate to
award a contract to the lowest responsible bidder, the affected
contract is "void."41 "Supervisors are public officers of limited au-
thority, and their right to contract is statutory. Hence contracts
entered into by them in violation of a statute are void, and a con-
tract in violation of the statute cannot be enforced although not
expressly made void."47 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
noted that those who contract "with the officials of a quasi-
municipality" must keep in mind that these officials have only
"limited power to contract.
4 8
There are two components to the statutory requirement that a
municipality award a contract to the "lowest responsible bidder."
First, the successful bidder must be the "lowest bidder." Second,
that bidder must be "responsible." Those components must be
analyzed separately because a municipality may exercise discre-
tion as to the latter component whereas there is no discretion as to
the former.
A. Lowest Bidder
Although the definition of "lowest bidder" may seem self-
evident, that term "implies a common standard under which all
bids may be received. That common standard implies previously
prepared specifications, freely accessible for all competitors; on
these alone shall their bids be based."' Without a common stan-
dard, the integrity of the competitive bidding process is violated
and the purpose of competitive bidding is frustrated."" "If the
45. Lutz Appellate Printers, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 403 A.2d 530, 534
(Pa. 1979).
46. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 56802(b)(3). See, e.g., Price v. Philadelphia Parking Auth., 221
A.2d 138, 147 (Pa. 1966) (contract, which involved the lease of air rights above a parking
garage, was "entered into by private negotiation rather than by competitive bidding [and
therefore] was unauthorized and void."); Foresman v. Gregg Township, 147 A. 64 (Pa. 1929)
(contract void due to failure to comply with statute in entering contract to purchase trac-
tor).
47. Foresman v. Gregg Township, 147 A. 64, 65 (Pa. 1929).
48. Id. at 67.
49. Ezy Parks, 454 A.2d at 932-33.
50. Id. at 932 (quoting McQUILLAN, supra note 3, §29.29 at 302). As explained in Ezy
Parks, competitive bidding requirements also apply when a municipality is seeking to sell
or lease an asset for the highest price to be paid to the municipality. "We see no reason
why the same rationale should not apply where the purpose is to secure the highest price
for Commonwealth realty which is available for lease." Ezy Parks, 454 A.2d at 933.
520 Vol. 41
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kind or amount of work or material which a municipal corporation
will require under a contract is indefinite, the advertisement for
bids thereon should contain sufficient information concerning the
work or material to enable bidders intelligently to calculate their
bids.""' The common standard thus ensures "that interested per-
sons may bid intelligently and will be induced to bid by the prom-
ise of impartiality and thereby freely and openly compete upon a
basis of equality.5 2
Although the lowest bidder is an objective issue that can be de-
termined by who submitted the lowest bid in terms of price, coun-
sel seeking to challenge a contract award should examine the bid
specifications to ensure that there in fact was a common basis for
the bids. If the bid specifications were written in such a way to
favor one bidder over another, or if there was an ambiguity in the
specifications that, intentionally or inadvertently, favored one
bidder over another or misled the bidders, then there was not a
"common basis" for the bids, and there is a basis for challenging
the award.53 If bidders "are misled by anything which the [mu-
nicipality] may have done, or the notice [concerning the bid] may
have required, the bidding was not on a common basis; the lowest
figures submitted would not, in law, be the lowest bid, because it
lacked fair competition." 4 In short, "[n]o scheme or device promo-
tive of favoritism or unfairness or which imposes limitations, not
applicable to all bidders alike, will be tolerated."5
For example, in Ezy Parks v. Larson,6 the Supreme Court up-
held an injunction prohibiting a contract award based on bid
specifications that were ambiguous. The Pennsylvania Depart-
ment of Transportation ("PennDOT") leased certain parcels of land
along a right-of-way it owned to Ezy Parks, which operated park-
ing lots on those parcels and made valuable improvements to
those parking lots during the term of its lease. 7 When PennDOT
sought to competitively bid contracts for the parcels, its specifica-
51. Id. at 933 (quoting MCQUILLAN, supra, note 3, § 29.66 at 378).
52. Id. at 932-33.
53. Id. at 933.
54. Id. at 932-33.
55. Ezy Parks, 454 A.2d at 932 (quotinglO MCQUILLAN, supra note 42 §29.29 at 302).
As explained in Ezy Parks, competitive bidding requirements apply when a municipality is
seeking to sell or lease an asset. "We see no reason why the same rationale should not
apply where the purpose is to secure the highest price for Commonwealth realty which is
available for lease." Id. at 624, 454 A.2d at 933.
56. 454 A.2d 928, 932 (Pa. 1982).
57. Id. at 931.
521
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tions were unclear as to whether the improvements were included
with the parcels.58 PennDOT and the current leaseholders in fact
had disagreed over who owned the improvements and whether the
leaseholders would be compensated for the improvements.59 The
Supreme Court agreed with the Commonwealth Court that be-
cause of the ambiguity regarding the improvements, the specifica-
tions did not provide a common basis on which to determine who
submitted the highest bid to lease the parcels. The court deter-
mined that the same rationale applied to leases as it did to bid-
ding of projects: ensuring fair competition. Because bidders
might have "reduce[d] their bids ... to adjust for ambiguous in-
structions," the Commonwealth might have to pay both Ezy Parks
for its improvements to the Commonwealth's property and pass
the improvements to a high bidder who may not have included the
benefit of these improvements in its bid.6°
Finally, the bid instruction virtually precluded appellees [who
paid for the improvements while they had the leases] from en-
tering meaningful bids. Submitting bids which would include
the value of the improvements that have already been paid
for would put them in the position of paying for those items
twice. Entering bids which would not include that value
would decrease their chances of being awarded the leases be-
cause a competitor might well be including the value of those
permanent improvements which would customarily go with
the land.6
58. Id. at 931-32.
59. Id. at 932.
60. Id. at 933.
61. Ezy Parks, 454 A.2d at 933. Notably, a township may not cure ambiguous bid in-
structions by clarifying the instructions for less than all of the bidders. "[B]id instructions
which do not provide a common basis cannot be clarified on an ad hoc basis by ex parte
explanations from officials of a public body to those potential bidders who are either clever
enough to seek such advice or who simply, for whatever reason, have special access to the
ears of [municipal] officials." Id.
Vol. 41522
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1. Rejection of Bids
For a number of reasons relating to obtaining the lowest bid, 62
townships routinely insert a provision into the bid instructions
that they may reject any or all bids, in whole or in part." Al-
though a bid certainly may be rejected if it fails to comply with the
bid instructions or if the bidder is not responsible, there are limi-
tations on the extent to which a township may reject bids.6 "[I]f a
municipality, in connection with competitive bidding, is empow-
ered to do so, it may reject any and all bids in the absence of fraud,
collusion, bad faith, or arbitrary action."65 Thus, in considering
whether a township may reject bids, it is necessary to determine
whether it is "empowered to do so," as well as whether the bids
were rejected due to "fraud, collusion, bad faith, or arbitrary ac-
tion. 66
In Weber v. City of Philadelphia, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court upheld the rejection of bids for a general concession at a
sports stadium in Philadelphia after examining the Philadelphia
Home Rule Charter, which provides that Philadelphia "may reject
all bids if it shall deem it in the interest of the City so to do. Oth-
erwise the contract shall be awarded to the lowest responsible
bidder."67 According to the Court, "as we read this Charter Provi-
sion, the City, in competitive bidding, is authorized and empow-
ered to reject all bids subject only to the limitation that such rejec-
tion be 'in the interest of the City,' and the determination of that
question is placed, at least initially, in the judgment not of the
courts but of the City..."68  Consistent with Philadelphia's Home
Rule Charter, the bid specifications "clearly placed [all bidders] on
notice that, under the provisions of the City Charter and under
62. See, e.g., Midasco, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 813 A.2d 942, 944
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002) (rejection of bids proper where bids made project economically in-
feasible); Richland School Dist. v. Central Transp., Inc., 560 A.2d 885, 887-89 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1989) (holding that municipality was permitted to reject all bids due to a clerical error
in one bid since all bidders had right to re-bid and municipality reasonably expected to
receive lower bids in the re-bidding).
63. For a detailed discussion on the right to reject bids, see Annotation, Public Con-
tracts: Authority of State or its Subdivisions to Reject All Bids, 52 A.L.R. 4th 186.
64. Lutz Appellate Printers, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 403 A.2d 530, 533
(Pa. 1979) (citations omitted).
65. Weber v. Philadelphia, 262 A.2d 297, 299-300 (Pa. 1970) (citing cases).
66. Id.
67. Id. Like Philadelphia, the City of Pittsburgh has expressly reserved the right to




the specifications, the City had the right to reject any and all
bids."6 9
In contrast to the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter, the First
Class Township Code does not "empower" municipalities to reject
conforming bids. As a result, an argument can be made that a
municipality does not have the right to reject all bids when they
are submitted by responsible bidders. However, the Supreme
Court held in Straw v. City of Williamsport,7" that a municipality
had the right to reject a portion of all bids based solely on the fact
that it retained such a right in its advertisement for bids. The
City of Williamsport had solicited bids for road paving and for cer-
tain sewer work.7" Due to financial constraints, Williamsport
eliminated the sewer work after bids were received."2 Once the
sewer work was eliminated, the lowest bidder became the second
lowest bidder.73 The party challenging the award argued that the
bids had to be tabulated as submitted and the lowest bid deter-
mined based on that tabulation before elimination of any work
and the associated costs.74 The court rejected this interpretation,
noting that the fact that "[t]he advertisement [soliciting bids] re-
served the right to reject any or all bids or parts of bids" was "con-
clusive of the question."75 All contractors bidding on the project
were given notice that the city might eliminate parts of the bid.76
As long as the elimination was applied consistently, the rejection
was proper. The trial court determined in its duties as fact finder
"that there was no fraud, imposition, over-reaching or unfair deal-
ing in striking out the items or awarding the contract."77  The
Straw decision thus appears to stand for the proposition that a
township may reject any part or all of the bids so long as it advises
69. Id. at 300.
70. 132 A. 804, 805 (Pa. 1926).




75. Id. See also R.S. Noonan, Inc. v. York School Dist., 162 A.2d 623 (Pa. 1960) ("As a
final observation on the case, attention is drawn to the fact that the advertisement inviting
bids included this statement: 'right is reserved to waive informalities and to accept any bid
or to reject any or all bids.' This put all bidders on notice that their bids might be re-
jected.") (rejection of all bids upheld); Kimmel, 633 A.2d at 1276 ("In the absence of evi-
dence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrary action, whether a municipality was wise in its rejec-
tion of a bid is not within the court's province to determine.") (citing Weber, 262 A.2d 297).
76. Straw, 132 A. at 805.
77. Id.
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of that right in the advertisement of bids and applies the rejection
equally to all bidders.
Reservation of a right to reject bids does not, however, insulate
a municipality's rejection of bids from scrutiny. In Stapleton v.
Berks County,"5 the bid specifications provided Berks County with
"the right to reject any or all proposals with or without cause."
Berks County in fact rejected all bids when its preferred contrac-
tor did not submit the lowest bid.79 "Private meetings and negotia-
tions with some bidders to the exclusion of others before the con-
tract is awarded is precisely the sort of favoritism and unfair ad-
vantage that Harris and its progeny disdained."" "In cases where
public contract bidding irregularities are shown, it is proper for a
reviewing court to enjoin the contract awarded according to those
faulty procedures."8 "Berks County's attempt to reserve the right
to have bids clarified and to negotiate with bidders after the bids
were opened has no effect since our Supreme Court has rejected
those procedures." 2
2. Waiver Of Defects In Bids
Although a township may have the right to reject bids, a related
issue frequently arises as to whether a township may waive an
irregularity in a bid submitted by the low bidder. In order to
award a contract to the lowest bidder, that bidder must have com-
78. 593 A.2d 1323, 1330 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
79. Stapleton, 593 A.2d at 1330.
80. Id. at 1331 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
81. Id. at 1332.
82. Id. at 1330. See also Lutz Appellate Printers, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania, 403 A.2d 530, 534 (Pa. 1979) (Commonwealth Department of Property and Supplies
was required to award contract to lowest responsible bidder even though statute gave Com-
monwealth Department the right to reject any or all bids). The Lutz case involved the
Administrative Code of 1929, which (unlike the First Class Township Code at issue here),
specifically provided in § 2410 that the Department 'shall have the right to reject any or all
bids." Id. at 532. Yet even though the Department had a statutory right to reject bids, the
Supreme Court repudiated the argument that the Department had "absolute discretion" to
reject bids.
But to read [§ 2410] to give the Department absolute discretion, except in cases of
'fraud or collusion,' would be to ignore the language of Section 2410 requiring the De-
partment to award the contract to the 'lowest responsible qualified bidder.' ... [T]his
requirement is 'mandatory, not discretionary.' ... [W]here a 'sound discretion, exer-
cised according to the standards fixed for the protection of the public' is required of
public officials who reject a low bid and award a public contract to a higher bidder,
the same 'sound discretion' must be exercised here where the Department determines
Section 523 of the Code renders a low, responsible bidder 'unqualified.'
Id. at 533 (citations omitted).
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plied with all material terms of the bid instructions. "Bid instruc-
tions set forth in an invitation to bid are mandatory and must be
strictly followed for the bid to be valid."3 In reviewing a bid, the
township does not have discretion to waive material defects in the
bid.84 "[D]etermining whether the requirements contained in the
bid invitation were met is not a discretionary matter. These re-
quirements are mandatory. [I]f the bid fails to comply with the
instructions, the bid is invalid, even if the bidder wishes to cure
the non-conformity after the bids are opened."85
The court may, however, waive non-material bid defects. In
Gaeta v. Ridley School District,86 the Supreme Court approved a
contract award to a bidder whose bid failed to comply with a non-
material requirement of the bid instructions. The school district
required a bid (as opposed to performance) bond from a surety
with a rating of "A-" or better." The district awarded the contract
to the low bidder, whose bid was approximately $100,000 less than
the next lowest bid, even though that bidder submitted a bid that
included a bid bond from a surety with a "B" rating.88 Prior to
awarding the contract, the district notified the bidder of the ir-
regularity and requested a conforming bid bond, which was sub-
mitted the following day.89 The contract award was challenged on
the basis that the apparent low bidder did not comply with the bid
specifications." The bid instructions included a reservation of
rights that permitted the district to waive any bid irregularities.9'
The Court held that the district had discretion to waive the bid
83. City of Philadelphia v. Canteen Co., 581 A.2d 1009, 1013 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990);
Kimmel v. Lower Paxton Twp., 633 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993); Gaeta v.
Ridley School Dist., 788 A.2d 363 (Pa. 2002) ("this prerequisite of compliance with bid
documentation assures equal footing among competing bidders in furtherance of core legis-
lative objectives.").
84. Kimmel, 633 A.2d at1275; Shaeffer, 754 A.2d at 723 (waiver by county of violation
of bid requirements gave a competitive advantage, which amounted to favoritism).
85. Kimmel, 633 A.2d at 1276. See also Canteen Co., 581 A.2d at 1013 ("It is well set-
tled that the specifications set forth in a bidding document are mandatory and must be
strictly followed for the bid to be valid. Violation of bid instructions constitutes legally
disqualifying error and a public agent may reject a bid for such error.") Id. (citations omit-
ted).
86. 788 A.2d 363 (2002).




91. Id. at 363-64.
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irregularity:2 "[C]ourts have not eliminated the discretionary as-
pect of executive decision making" from the bidding process.
93
Accordingly, the following two considerations are widely ac-
cepted as central in determining whether a non-compliant bid
for public work may be accepted or cured: first, whether the
effect of waiver would be to deprive the municipality of its as-
surance that the contract will be entered into, performed and
guaranteed according to its specified requirements, and sec-
ond, whether it is of such a nature that its waiver would ad-
versely affect competitive bidding by placing a bidder in a po-
sition of advantage over other bidders or by otherwise under-
mining the necessary standard of competition.94
After identifying that standard for waiver, the Court "reiter-
ate[d its] admonition that, in circumstances where legislative pro-
nouncements particularize the manner in which government con-
tracts are to be made, such requirements are not subject to
waiver."95 Because (1) no statute or ordinance required a quality
rating for bid bonds, (2) the school district reserved the right to
waive irregularities, (3) the irregularity was not material, and (4)
the waiver did not give an unfair advantage to the successful bid-
der, the Court held that the school district properly exercised its
discretion in waiving the bidding irregularity and awarding the
contract to the lowest bidder.9"
92. Gaeta, 788 A.2d at 364.
93. Id. at 367-68.
94. Id. at 367-68 (quoting, inter alia, MCQUILLIN, supra note 3, § 29.65). Cf Midasco,
Inc. v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 2002 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 982 (Dec. 11, 2002)
(affirming rejection of all bids where bids significantly exceeded estimated cost of project).
95. Gaeta, 788 A.2d at 368.
96. Id. at 368-69. The Court distinguished the bid bond "from those [circumstances]
involving price discrepancies, failure to bid on all necessary terms, the omission of cost or
performance items, and defects related to a performance bond, concerning which liability is
generally of far greater magnitude." Id. at 369 (citing MCQUILLIN, supra note 3, § 29.65).
Cf. Balsbaugh v. Commonwealth Dept. of General Servs., 2003 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 1, at
*13 (Jan. 2, 2003) (failure to sign bid was material and could not be waived) (applying
Gaeta); Cardiac Science, Inc. v. Department of General Servs., 808 A.2d 1029 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2002) (affirming decision to reject bid as non-conforming based on delivery term, which
was material) (applying Gaeta).
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3. Withdrawal of Bid By Bidder
Whereas a municipality may reject bids, a bidder may not with-
draw its bid unless expressly permitted to do so by the bid specifi-
cations or a statute. 97
The submission of a bid for public work in response to an invi-
tation constitutes an offer. A good and binding contract is
formed when the public body, acting by responsible officers,
accepts a written bid. A public contract has its inception in
the award as distinguished from the formal signing of the
contract, and is binding from that time on. It is the contrac-
tor, not the governmental unit, which acts at its peril in sub-
mitting bids and entering into a contract. As a general rule,
one who files a bid pursuant to a competitive bidding statute
has no right to withdraw the bid, the reason being that the
benefits accruing to one submitting a bid under the public
bidding statutes are a sufficient consideration to render a bid
submitted irrevocable.98
Under the "firm bid rule", the irrevocability of bids applies even
if the bidder makes a clerical mistake in its bid.99 A contractor
discovering an error after bid opening may not withdraw his bid
"without forfeiting his bid bond."'00 Assuming no right to with-
draw, the bidder loses its bid bond if it in fact withdraws its bid or
refuses to execute the contract documents.0 ' A bidder, therefore,
must take extreme care in ensuring the accuracy of its bid.
A bidder may withdraw its bid when a statute or the bid specifi-
cations permit it to do so."0 2 For example, a bidder on a public con-
struction project or "for the provisions of services to or lease of real
or personal property" may withdraw a bid within two days after
97. Muncy Area School Dist. v. Gardner, 497 A.2d 683, 687 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985) ("a
statute may permit a bidder who makes an honest and good faith mistake of calculation in
estimating his bid to withdraw his bid"); Travelers Indemn. Co. v. Susquehanna County
Commissioners, 331 A.2d 918, 919 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975) (bid specifications permitted
withdrawal); Modany v. State Public School Bldg. Auth., 208 A.2d 276, 178 (Pa. 1965)
(same).
98. Muncy, 497 A.2d at 686-87.
99. Travelers, 331 A.2d at 920.
100. Id.
101. Travelers, 331 A.2d at 920.
102. Muncy, 497 A.2d at 687 ("a statute may permit a bidder who makes an honest and
good faith mistake of calculation in estimating his bid to withdraw his bid"); Travelers, 331
A.2d at 919 (bid specifications permitted withdrawal); Modany v. State Public School Bldg.
Auth., 208 A.2d 276, 178 (Pa. 1965) (same).
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bid opening under certain limited circumstances.10 3 It should be
emphasized that § 1602 does not apply to all municipal contracts
and that many bid specifications do not confer a right to withdraw
bids. Without carefully reviewing § 1602 and the bid specifica-
tions, a bidder should not assume that it has the right to withdraw
its bid.
B. Responsible Bidder
As to a "responsible bidder," discretion exists with the munici-
pality to make the determination regarding the "responsibility" of
the bidder.0
There is a discretion vested [in the municipal decisionmakers]
to determine who are and who are not responsible bidders, ...
the contract must be awarded, if at all, to the one of them
whose bid is lowest, though there is but a slight difference in
amount between him and another bidder whom the board
would like to favor. The money to be expended is public
money-a trust fund-and, in matters of this kind, the law
recognizes no right in the directors to expend any of it, how-
ever small, except for work done by the 'lowest responsible
bidder."'
The municipality may consider a number of factors that extend
beyond whether a particular contractor has the financial ability to
perform a contract. A non-exclusive list of factors that may be
considered in determining whether a bidder is "responsible" "in-
cludes financial responsibility, also integrity, efficiency, industry,
experience, promptness, and ability to successfully carry out the
particular undertaking, and that a bond will not supply the lack of
these characteristics. 06
103. 73 PA.CONS.STAT. § 1602.
104. A. Pickett Constr. , Inc. v. Luzerne Co. Convention Center, 738 A.2d 20, 24 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1999) (emphasis added) (quoting Wilson v. City of New Castle, 152 A. 102, 104
(Pa. 1930)).
105. Lutz Appellate Printers, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 403 A.2d 530, 533
(Pa. 1979) (citations omitted).
106. Kratz v. Allentown, 155 A. 116, 117 (Pa. 1931) (emphasis added); Pearlman v.
Pittsburgh, 155 A. 118, 119 (Pa. 1931) ("the directors were not bound in law to give the
contract to the lowest bidder, who might be irresponsible"). For example, a municipality
may consider which bidder can perform the contract in the manner safest to the bidder's
employees and the public. See J.J.D. Urethane Co. v. Montgomery Co., 694 A.2d 368, 370-
71 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997).
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In evaluating those factors, municipalities are presumed to have
acted "in a legal way" in connection with exercising their discre-
tion. "For the law in this Commonwealth is that public officers
are clothed with the responsibility of originating and executing
plans for the public good; the presumption is that their acts are on
such considerations and their decisions reached in a legal way af-
ter an investigation."1 7 As a result, the party challenging the de-
termination of responsibility has the burden of proving an abuse
of discretion, and "it is a heavy burden."' The existence of that
discretion is important because the Court's review of a discretion-
ary decision is carefully circumscribed:
[C]ourts will not review the actions of governmental bodies or
administrative tribunals involving acts of discretion, in the
absence of bad faith, fraud, capricious action or abuse of
power; they will not inquire into the wisdom of such actions or
into the details of the manner adopted to carry them into exe-
cution. It is true that the mere possession of discretionary
power by an administrative body does not make it wholly im-
mune from judicial review, but the scope of that review is lim-
ited to the determination of whether there has been a mani-
fest and flagrant abuse of discretion or a purely arbitrary exe-
cution of the agency's duties or functions. That a court might
have a different opinion or judgment in regard to the action of
the agency is not a sufficient ground for interference; judicial
discretion may not be substituted for administrative discre-
tion.1°9
Although township commissioners are presumed to act in a le-
gal way, the municipality must have conducted a "full" and "care-
ful investigation" that provides it with "knowledge of the real
situation""' before determining that a bidder is not responsible.
107. A. Pickett Constr,, Inc., 738 A.2d at 24 (emphasis added) (quoting Wilson v. City of
New Castle, 152 A. 102, 104 (Pa. 1930)).
108. Id.
109. American Totalisator Co., Inc. v. Seligman, 414 A.2d 1037, 1040-41 (Pa. 1980)
(quoting Blumenschein v. Pittsburgh Housing Auth., 109 A.2d 331, 334-35 (Pa. 1954));
Kimmel, 633 A.2d at 1274 (same).
110. Kratz v. Allentown, 155 A. 116, 117 (Pa. 1931).
At the same time, it is held that to award the contract to a higher bidder capriciously
without a full and careful investigation is an abuse of discretion which equity will re-
strain. Where a full investigation discloses a substantial reason which appeals to the
sound discretion of the municipal authorities they may award a contract to one not in
dollars the lowest bidder. The sound discretion, which is upheld, must be based upon
a knowledge of the real situation gained by a careful investigation.
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Notably, a township has discretion in determining what the inves-
tigation will entail. Courts "will not ... inquire into the details of
the manner adopted to carry [acts of discretion] into execution."
111
The Supreme Court has not defined the precise contours of the
"investigation" that a municipality must perform to implement the
discretionary act of determining whether a contractor is responsi-
ble. Nevertheless, it is clear that "knowledge of the real situation"
is the touchstone for evaluating whether a municipality appropri-
ately exercised its discretion." 2 To have "knowledge of the real
situation," the Township's decision must be based on facts rather
than supposition, speculation, bias, or another improper basis, and
the investigation necessarily will vary depending on whether the
municipality has prior experience with the bidder that it can use
to assess (among other factors) the bidder's "ability to successfully
carry out the" contract."3
A court will require a more formal investigation if the township
does not have prior experience with a bidder it deems not to be
responsible. In Berryhill v. Dugan,"4 the court found that the mu-
nicipality abused its discretion in awarding a contract to the in-
cumbent refuse collector that submitted a higher bid. Although
the Borough claimed that the lowest bidder- with whom it had
never contracted-was not responsible, the Commonwealth Court
observed that the lowest bidder had "a favorable Dunn & Brad-
street rating, a bonding capacity of [$3 million], it owns its own
landfill and has access to 40 different trucks, with" $7 million in
gross revenues, "which information was readily available upon
inquiry.""' And unlike the low bidder, the incumbent's bid did not
conform to the bid specifications, the incumbent "was character-
ized by the Borough's Manager as being in poor financial condi-
tion, and the condition of its equipment was in question."6 The
only apparent advantage the company possessed is that it had
previously served as the trash hauler for the Borough .... ""s' Ac-
Id.
111. American Totalisator, 414 A.2d at 1040-41 (quoting Blumenschein, 109 A.2d at 334-
35).
112. Kratz, 155 A. at 117.
113. Id.
114. 491 A.2d 950 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985).
115. Berryhill, 491 A.2d at 952.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 951.
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cordingly, the court held that the Borough abused its discretion in
determining that the low bidder was not responsible.11
Similarly, in Summit Hill School Directors Removal,"9 the Su-
preme Court held that directors of a school district were properly
removed because they awarded a contract for the construction of a
school building to a higher bidder without performing an appro-
priate investigation.
What the law requires is the exercise of a sound discretion by
the directors; they shall call to their assistance the means of
information at hand to form an intelligent judgment. They
should investigate the bidders to learn their financial stand-
ing, reputation, experience, resources, facilities, judgment and
efficiency as builders. Not only was this not done here, but
there is every indication that a majority of the directors, in-
cluding appellants, awarded the contract pursuant to a prede-
termined plan to do so regardless of other bidders, and fol-
lowed the award by resolutions relieving the favored contrac-
tor from fulfilling important stipulations set forth in the
specifications. 120
In contrast, a township does not need to conduct a formal inves-
tigation when it has prior experience with a bidder. In Kierski v.
Township of Robinson, 2' the Commonwealth Court affirmed the
decision of the trial court that Robinson Township properly
awarded a contract to the second lowest bidder due to the lowest
bidder not being responsible. The Township competitively bid its
contract for refuse collection and received three bids. In evaluat-
ing the bids, it determined that the lowest bidder-which was the
incumbent refuse collector-was not responsible based on numer-
ous problems experienced by the Township with the collector's
performance under the prior contract.'22 In challenging the Town-
ship's award of the contract to the second lowest bidder who was
responsible, the incumbent collector ("Vogel") argued that the
118. Id. at 952. If a municipality has concerns about the responsibility of one or more
anticipated bidders before issuing its bid specifications, a municipality may want to pre-
qualify bidders as responsible so long as the same standard applies to all bidders. See, e.g.,
Hams v. Philadelphia, 149A.722, 734 (Pa. 1930); Cocoran v. Philadelphia, 70 A.2d 621, 623
(Pa. 1950).
119. 137 A. 143 (Pa. 1927).
120. Id. at 144
121. 810 A.2d 196 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002). The author was counsel for Waste Manage-
ment, the appellee in this case.
122. Kierski, 810 A.2d at 197.
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Township failed "to conduct a full and careful investigation" into
whether the collector was responsible. The court rejected the
claim, finding that the Township had "knowledge of the real situa-
tion" as a result of its own experience, which obviated the need for
a formal investigation to commence after bids were received:" 4
Here, several Township officials credibly testified about their
own personal experiences with Vogel's performance under the
2001 contract. Thus, the Township had "knowledge of the
real situation" based on a year of receiving complaints and
paying employees to pick up garbage, clean up hydraulic leaks
and repair roads. Certainly, where a municipality has no per-
sonal experience with the ability of the lowest bidder to per-
form under a particular contract, the municipality must con-
duct a full and complete investigation before awarding the
contract to a higher bidder. In this case, however, no investi-
gation could give the Township better knowledge of Vogel's
ability to perform under the Township's refuse collection ser-
vices contract than the knowledge gained from the Township's
personal experience with Vogel in 2001.125
Similarly, in Cain v. Winter,2 ' the trial court evaluated the un-
successful bidder's deficient performance of a previous contract in
denying a petition for a preliminary injunction that sought to en-
join the award of a new contract to one who was not the lowest
bidder. In concluding that the Philadelphia Procurement Com-
missioner appropriately exercised discretion in concluding that
the low bidder was not responsible, the court, among other things,
found that Philadelphia's "prior experience of printing work per-
formed by [the disappointed bidder] for the City of Philadelphia
with respect to a job requiring far less printing was not wholly
satisfactory" and that the low bidder's "plant and personnel were
inadequate to fully perform the job."'27 In reaching his decision,
123. Id. at 199.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 199. See also Adler v. Township of Bristol, 475 A.2d 1361, 1362-63 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1984), in which the Commonwealth Court affirmed the denial of an injunction
to a waste hauler who was the lowest bidder. Bristol Township had agreements with both
haulers who submitted bids and awarded the contract to the second lowest bidder as a
result of, among other things, questions concerning the low bidder's responsibility based on
its having sued Bristol in connection with an earlier contract and employing officers with
criminal convictions.
126. 72 Pa. D. & C.2d 64 (Phila. Co. 1975).
127. Cain, 72 Pa. D. & C. 2d at 80.
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the commissioner had received recommendations from personnel
who visited the disappointed bidder's plant that "on the basis of
the conditions and capabilities observed, the award not be given
to" that bidder.128 As a result, the "Procurement Commissioner's
rejection of the 'prima facie' lowest bidder was founded on a full
and honest investigation and cannot be repudiated as an arbitrary
or capricious abuse of discretion."'29 Moreover, as to the successful
bidder, the commissioner "was satisfied with [its] past perform-
ance ... in printing election materials, its financial position as re-
flected by Dun & Bradstreet and had no reason to believe the
company incapable of satisfactory performance of this contract." °
IV. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Any contract entered in violation of the Code is "void." 3' Conse-
quently, injunctive relief is available to prevent an award of a
municipal contract to one not the lowest responsible bidder. To
obtain such relief, the party challenging the award must have
standing to do so and must meet the standard for obtaining the
extraordinary relief of an injunction.
A. Standing to Challenge Award of the Contract
Although a municipality must award a contract to the lowest re-
sponsible bidder, only a taxpayer of the municipality awarding the
contract has standing to challenge a contract award."3 2 A disap-
pointed bidder, in contrast, has "no claim of entitlement to a pub-
lic contract based on the requirement that the contract be
128. Id. at 86.
129. Id. at 81.
130. Id. at 90.
131. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 56802(b); See also Foresman v. Gregg Township, 147 A. 64, 65
(Pa. 1929) (township contracts "in violation of a statute are void.").
132. See, e.g., Ezy Parks v. Larson, 454 A.2d 928, 934 (Pa. 1982); American Totalisator
Co. v. Seligman, 414 A.2d 1037, 1040 (Pa. 1980); Price v. Philadelphia Parking Auth., 221
A.2d 138, 143 (Pa. 1966) ("taxpayer may challenge the 'wrongful expenditures of tax monies
and the wasting of assets.'") (quoting Loewen v. Shapiro, 133 A.2d 525, 527 (Pa. 1957);
James T. O'Hara, Inc. v. Borough of Moosic, 611 A.2d 1332, 1334 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992)
("Although Mascaro recognized that bidders who are also taxpayers may challenge public
contract awards, we did not extend this right to a Pennsylvania taxpayer who paid no taxes
in the county which awarded the contract."). It is not enough that the plaintiff is a tax-
payer of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Nunemacher v. Borough of Middletown, 759
A.2d 57, 62 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) ("Our precedents make clear that such general taxpayer
standing does not exist, notwithstanding the extent of Commonwealth funds contributed
towards the local project.").
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awarded to the lowest responsible bidder, since in Pennsylvania,
that requirement is solely for the protection of the taxpayers:"'
In Pennsylvania, a disappointed bidder has sustained no in-
jury which entitles him to redress in court, even if the public
official who refuses to award him the contract has a statutory
obligation to award it to the lowest bidder. Although those
statutory provisions requiring competitive bidding give the
public in a taxpayer's suit the right to demand that the lowest
responsible bidder be awarded the contract, such provisions
do not vest a cause of action for breach of damage in the low-
est bidder."
One alternative for a disappointed bidder is to review its roster
of employees to determine whether any is a resident of the mu-
nicipality bidding the contract. If so, the employee may challenge
the award, even if the employer funds the cost of the litigation.
The employee's affiliation with the disappointed bidder does not in
any way preclude the employee from having standing as a tax-
payer to challenge the award."' Indeed, a disappointed bidder has
standing to challenge a contract award if the bidder is a taxpayer
of the municipality awarding the contract.'36
A party may waive standing as a defense, in which case the dis-
appointed bidder may participate in the lawsuit even if it is not a
taxpayer of the municipality.'37 Counsel should consider whether
there are any tactical advantages to having the disappointed bid-
der be a party to the action. Possible advantages might include
easier discovery and the opportunity to assert that the bidder
made binding admissions during discovery that may not be avail-
able if the bidder were a non-party.
133. J. P. Mascaro & Sons, Inc. v. Township of Bristol, 497 F. Supp. 625, 627 (E.D. Pa.
1980).
134. J.P. Mascaro & Sons, Inc. v. Township of Bristol, 505 A.2d 1071, 1073-74 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1986) (waste hauler lacked standing to challenge contract award). Assuming
the plaintiff is a taxpayer, which can be verified through the municipality's records, liti-
gants generally stipulate to standing such that the taxpayer need not testify at trial.
135. Pleasant Hills Constr. Co., Inc. v. Public Auditorium Auth. Of Pittsburgh and Alle-
gheny Co., 782 A.2d 58, 76-77 (Pa. 2001) rev'd on other grounds, 784 A.2d 1277 (Pa. 2001).
136. Mascaro, 505 A.2d at 1074 n.3 (citing Lasday v. Allegheny Co., 453 A.2d 949 (Pa.
1982); American Totalisator, 414 A.2d 1037; Ezy Parks, 454 A.2d 928.
137. A. Pickett Constr., Inc. v. Luzerne County Convention Ctr. Auth., 738 A.2d 20, 23
n.1 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999) (citing In re Estate of Schram, 696 A.2d 1206, 1209 n.4 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1997), allocatur denied, 705 A.2d 1313 (Pa. 1997)("a party may waive its
opportunity to contest the standing of another party by not raising the issue in a timely
manner.").
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B. The Standard for Injunctive Relief
Assuming there is standing to challenge the award, the tax-
payer-plaintiff must satisfy five criteria to obtain injunctive relief:
(1) Immediate and irreparable harm will occur in the absence
of injunctive relief.
(2) Greater injury will result from a refusal of the injunction
than from a grant of it.
(3) Injunctive relief will restore the parties to their status as
existing immediately prior to the alleged wrongful conduct.
(4) Injunctive relief is appropriate to abate the Township's
conduct.
(5) Plaintiffs have a clear right to relief.'38
These requirements are addressed in order.
To demonstrate irreparable harm, a taxpayer need prove only
that the contract was awarded in violation of a statute. "Statutory
violations are sufficiently injurious to constitute irreparable harm,
and a preliminary injunction may be upheld based upon the viola-
tion of competitive bidding requirements."'39 Township "supervi-
sors are public officers of limited authority and their right to con-
tract is statutory. Hence, contracts entered into by them in viola-
tion of a statute are void, and a contract in violation of the statute
cannot be enforced although not expressly made void." 4
To demonstrate greater injury, a taxpayer must show that de-
nial of an injunction will in effect sanction a municipality's con-
138. John G. Bryant, Co., Inc. v. Sling Testing and Repair, Inc., 369 A.2d 1164, 1167 (Pa.
1977); Beck Computing Servs. Inc. v. Anderson, 524 A.2d 990, 991-92 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987);
Shaeffer v. City of Lancaster, 754 A.2d 719, 723 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000).
139. Shaeffer v. City of Lancaster, 754 A.2d 719, 723 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) (citing
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission v. Israel, 52 A.2d 317 (1947)); Pleasant Hills
Constr. Co., Inc., 782 A.2d 68, 79 ("violation of an express provision of a statute is per se
irreparable harm for purposes of a preliminary injunction."). See also Price v. Philadelphia
Parking Auth., 221 A.2d 138, 147 (Pa. 1966) (agreement "entered into by private negotia-
tion rather than by competitive bidding was unauthorized and void.").
140. Foresman v. Gregg Township, 147 A. 64, 65 (Pa. 1929) (township contracts "in vio-
lation of a statute are void."). See also 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 56802(b)(3). The court in
Foresman also observed that "[i]t may not be improper to emphasize the fact that he who
deals with the officials of a quasi municipality is bound to take notice of its limited author-
ity to contract." 147 A. at 67.
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duct because the contract would be permitted to become effec-
tive.' In contrast, a grant of injunctive relief would require a
municipality to comply with its preexisting duties under the
Code.' Moreover, the grant of an injunction will promote the goal
of insuring that the Township follows a fair bidding process for its
contracts, which promotes taxpayers' confidence in government.
"[F]airness lies at the heart of the bidding process, and all bidders
must be confronted with the same requirements and be given the
same fair opportunity to bid in free competition with each
other."' In contrast, a municipality may argue in its defense that
injunctive relief would deny its residents necessary services pro-
vided under the challenged contract.
As to returning parties to the status quo, injunctive relief in-
validating a contract would return the parties to their status be-
fore the municipality improperly awarded a contract to one not the
lowest responsible bidder. The bids would be considered, and the
contract awarded, on the basis of which contractor submitted the
lowest responsible bid. However, if the contract challenge was not
filed until after performance of the contract had commenced, a
municipality may have a strong argument that any injunctive re-
lief will change the status quo.
As to whether injunctive relief is appropriate to abate conduct, a
contract award in violation of competitive bidding requirements is
precisely the type of conduct that can be abated by an injunction.
Under the Code, a contract made in violation of § 56802(b)(1) is
"void," ' so entry of an injunction to enjoin a void contract is not
only appropriate but necessary.141
Finally, as to a clear right to relief, that element is met in con-
nection with proof that a municipality awarded the contract to a
bidder who was not the lowest responsible bidder. A "contract
141. Shaeffer, 754 A.2d at 723 (agreeing that denial of injunctive relief "would result in
the sanctioning of an illegal award" of a contract).
142. See 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 56802 (dealing with a township's general duties) and §
56527 (dealing with township's ability to regulate ashes, garbage, rubbish and refuse re-
moval).
143. Shaeffer, 754 A.2d at 723.
144. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 56802(b)(3) (2002).
145. Cf Ezy Parks v. Larson, 454 A.2d 928, 932 (Pa. 1982) ("When competitive bidding is
used and the procedures followed emasculate the benefits of such bidding, judicial interven-
tion is proper.") Id. (affirming injunction against award of contract based on ambiguity in
bid specifications ) Id.
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must be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder when a public
authority elects to use the public bidding process. " 46
C. Remedies Available if Injunctive Relief is Successful
If the court finds that the contract was not awarded to the low-
est responsible bidder, the court has two alternatives that it can
pursue in the exercise of its discretion. First, the court may order
the contract to be re-bid, which is most likely to occur (for exam-
ple) when there was an ambiguity in the bid specifications or bids
themselves or an error in the bidding procedures.'47 Second, the
court may award the contract to the unsuccessful bidder, but only
if the court finds that the bidder both submitted the lowest bid
and was responsible.'48
If the injunctive action is successful, the prevailing party has an
obligation to post a bond. "[T]rial courts determine bond amounts
on a case-by-case basis; of course, the bond should be sufficient to
cover damages that are reasonably foreseeable." 4 ' If the bond be-
comes inadequate, the municipality may petition the court for an
increase in the'amount of the bond.5 ' However, because an indi-
vidual taxpayer ordinarily challenges a contract award, the court
may waive the requirement of a bond.'
D. Defenses Available to the Township and the Successful Bidder
There are several defenses that a township should consider in
defending against an injunctive action challenging a contract
award. The available defenses will vary depending on the allega-
tions in the complaint, and the township should consult with its
solicitor or outside counsel to evaluate the claims and prepare the
defense.
146. Shaeffer, 754 A.2d at 723; Metropolitan Messenger Serv. v. Commonwealth, 317
A.2d 346, 349-50 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974) (affirming award of contract to lowest responsible
bidder).
147. American Totalisator, 414 A.2d at 1041.
148. Id. at 1042.
149. Pleasant Hills, 782 A.2d at 81 (citing Green County Solid Waste Auth., Greene
County Citizens United v. Green County Solid Waste Auth., 636 A.2d 1278 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1994).
150. Pleasant Hills, 782 A.2d at 81 (citing Dunlap v. Larkin, 493 A.2d 750 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1985) and 5 GOODRICH-AMRAM §1531(b):10.
151. Stapleton v. Berks County, 593 A.2d 1323, 1332 n.17 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (the
court mentions the county's right to waive the bond requirement under the Official Note to
PA. R. Civ. P. 1733).
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First, the township should determine whether the plaintiff has
standing to sue. If the plaintiff is not a taxpayer of the township,
then there is no standing to sue. The township thus should review
its tax rolls to determine whether the plaintiff is a taxpayer. If
the plaintiff is not a taxpayer, the township should file prelimi-
nary objections to the complaint to seek its dismissal.
Second, the plaintiff may have unreasonably delayed in seeking
injunctive relief, in which case the township may assert the de-
fense of laches."' "[F]or laches to apply, there must be a lack of
due diligence in pursuing a cause of action and resulting prejudice
to the other party."1 3 Although "a one-month delay [from the date
of learning of the contract award] in filing a complaint is not ex-
cessive,"'54 the delay likely would be excessive and prejudicial to
the township if the challenge is not filed until after the successful
bidder has already begun performing the contract or the township
has begun using the product purchased. In the absence of appro-
priate stipulated facts, the court must hold a hearing prior to sus-
taining a laches defense."'
Third, if the claim is that the township improperly found a bid-
der not to be responsible, the township should focus on the discre-
tion it may exercise in determining a bidder's responsibility and
then marshal the facts supporting its decision disqualifying a bid-
der as not responsible. The township should compile all docu-
ments relevant to the responsibility issue and identify those wit-
nesses with first-hand knowledge of problems associated with the
bidder, such as problems with the bidder's performance of a prior
contract with the township. Because of the likelihood of a contract
challenge in this situation, the township should compile its proof
before awarding the contract, which will corroborate its investiga-
tion and knowledge of the "real situation" and counter any conten-
tion that the township engaged in an after-the-fact justification for
its decision.
Fourth, if the claim is that the township improperly rejected
bids or waived irregularities, the township should defend based on
any instructions in the bid specifications which state that it has
the right to reject bids or waive irregularities. The township
needs to confirm that it either treated all bidders equally in reject-
152. See, e.g., Secor v. West Mifflin Area School Dist., 713 A.2d 1222, 1225 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1998).
153. Id.
154. Pleasant Hills, 782 A.2d at 76.
155. Secor, 713 A.2d at 1225.
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ing bids or that the waived irregularity involved a non-material
item. Although this technically may be an estoppel-type defense
(i.e., the bidder is estopped from challenging the bid award be-
cause it chose to submit a bid in response to bid specifications that
advised of the right to reject bids or waive irregularities), the de-
fense will fail if the rejection or waiver was arbitrary, capricious,
or otherwise not consistent with the principles underlying com-
petitive bidding. "[J]ustice does not permit a wrongdoer to escape
the consequences of his illegal conduct merely by first informing
the victim of his intent to commit the illegal act in question."
156
V. CONCLUSION
The competitive bidding of public contracts results not just in
significant cost savings to township but also in expensive litiga-
tion when there is a challenge to a contract award. By hewing
closely to the statutory framework and documenting the basis for
its decisions in evaluating bids and a bidder's responsibility, a
township can minimize its risk of litigation. Although that
framework is clear, human error or bias may cause a township to
deviate from the bidding requirements and create an opportunity
to challenge a contract award. In short, vigilance is required by
both the township and bidders for township contracts to ensure
that the competitive bidding process operates as intended to bene-
fit taxpayers and to guard against favoritism, improvidence, ex-
travagance, fraud and corruption in the awarding of municipal
contracts.
156. Pleasant Hills, 782 A.2d at 76 (citation omitted).
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